I show that, consistent with Krigman, Shaw, and Womack's (1999) findings on flipping activity, one-year IPO returns are predicted by first-day flipping activity.
Over the years, a number of market phenomena were identified in financial literature that seem to be potential profit opportunities for savvy investors.
Unfortunately, one of the reasons why many of these anomalies are not exploited is the difficulty in replicating the underlying academic studies. Practitioners look not only to identify the incongruities, but also to test their robustness as an investment strategy.
However, the needed data may be prohibitively costly to process or even unavailable for practitioners. In this work I examine the short-to-medium term performance of IPOs vis-à-vis observable factors that drive the decision-making process of the investing public. I extend the dataset used for a previous study on the subject by Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) . I replicate their original results, showing that the many of the main conclusions hold in a later time series. Furthermore, I extend their examination of "flipping" (10,000 shares or more blocks traded on the bid side of the market) to include flipping in the entire 25 day period up to the end of the quiet period. I also examine "equilibrium turnover" (average volume in days 5 through 25) and find that companies with the highest turnover are most likely to have high future one-year returns. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) (KSW) use first-day trading characteristics-first-day return and bid-side block volume in particular -to predict short-and medium-term IPO performance. Their basic premise is that the actions of institutional investors that have obtained new issue allocations are useful for inferring future returns. The academic literature often ascribes such predictive ability to these large entities, citing possibilities of superior information and investment management skill. It is in these investors' best interest, if they are informed, to hold on to the shares that will potentially perform well and immediately sell the stock that is likely to underperform. Their ability to do so will drive the selling pressure on the first day of trading of an overpriced issue. This is called "flipping," which has been widely publicized in the popular press. The essential findings of KSW are that IPO first-day performance can be used to predict longer-term stock returns. Firms with relatively high first-day return continue to perform well. They have also shown that institutional investors tend to "flip" the issues with subsequent relatively poor future returns. On the basis of their conclusions, they suggest a profitable trading strategy of buying "IPOs with positive (but not too positive)
returns and with relatively low sell-motivated block trading activity on the first day" (KSW, p. 1043).
My approach is to first replicate KSW results for their testing period from January 1993 through May 1995, and then extend the time series using my more recent sample. I find that the main findings of KSW from 1993 through 1995 hold into 1999.
I extend KSW framework in two ways. First, I collect and analyze the data from the first 25 days of trading in the IPO, or the quiet period. In the first 25 days of an IPO's life, information is practically non-existent because the SEC requires a "quiet period"
where the underwriting investment banks must not comment. Without sell-side research output, information available on these newly-public firms is limited to 1) the financial information in the prospectus and 2) the prices and volume of shares traded.
My second original contribution is to examine the quiet period "normalized" turnover (volume as a percent of shares offered). We know from KSW that large-block sell volume can serve as a proxy for institutional trading and be a powerful predictor of the future returns. However, there is no reason not to ask a more general question of whether overall volume can predict the IPO performance. While the efficient markets hypothesis states that volume cannot be used to infer returns in the future, some research exists which disputes that claim outside of the IPO context 1 .
This paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the construction of the dataset. Section II presents the extension and tests of various approaches described in KSW. Section III concludes. Appendix contains details on trade-signing algorithm. 1 For example, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) show that low-volume stocks outperform high-volume stocks, controlling for price momentum. Also High-volume losers and low-volume winners show greater persistence of momentum compared to low-volume losers and high-volume winners. Authors claim that high-volume losers and low-volume winners became losers and winners only recently, and thus will remain so for longer period of time. The opposite logic applies to low-volume losers and high-volume winners. The size adjusting is made by subtracting the compounded return on the appropriate CRSP market capitalization decile portfolio from the total return:
I. Data
where i t r is the raw return on stock i on day t, and size t r is the return on the CRSP size decile that stock i on day t. Monthly (21 trading days) returns are compounded starting on the 3 rd trading day of the IPO. The excess returns for individual stocks are averaged into PER (Portfolio Excess Returns) for each sub-partition of the sample in the study as follows:
where M n is the number of firms in portfolio. 8 7 Canina, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1998) provide excellent background on using various kinds of stock returns time-series. 8 Some prior academic studies of IPO performance used value-weighted PER. I believe that valueweighting will create unnecessary and potentially harmful bias towards larger firms. Portfolios in this model are constructed with greater emphasis on testing the information content of the factors based on the investor decision-making at the IPO events. As Loughran and Ritter (2000) point out, this "traditional event study approach in which all observations are weighted equally will produce point estimates that are relevant from the point of view of a manager, investor, or researcher attempting to predict the abnormal returns associated with a random event." (see footnote 2, Loughran and Ritter (2000)) I follow KSW and partition my sample into 4 portfolios of IPOs sorted by first day return, defined as return from IPO offer price to first day closing trade. First day return is zero percent or less on IPOs classified as "cold," between zero and 10% for "cool", between 10% and 60% for "hot," and above 60% for "extra-hot." I report summary statistics for both the replicated and extended period in Table I . The results generally hold for both the descriptive figures and the statistical tests. However, I find that KSW's findings on extra-hot IPOs, while underperforming in their study, do not underperform in the later sample. However, much lower medians in this subset indicate a right-skewed return distribution. I report excess returns in Figure I .
[ Figure I about here]
I also obtain first-day volume results similar to KSW for cold, cool, and hot IPOs.
Volume looks noticeably higher for extra-hot issues, however, Atkins and Dyl (1997) point out that the measure of volume reported by the dealer-driven NASDAQ market is not consistent with NYSE, and other auction markets. 9 They suggest halving NASDAQ volume to account for transactions with the dealers. When this adjustment is performed, the large difference disappears.
Flipping is a measure of the selling pressure on the IPO by institutional traders. It is defined by KSW as the ratio of daily sell-motivated block volume to total daily volume. A block is defined as 10,000 shares or more. The sum of block trades is used as a proxy for the daily trading activity of large traders. KSW report that the results are very similar when 5,000 share block cutoff is used. I follow KSW in using Lee and Ready (1991) tick-test algorithm to sign each trade as either sell-or buy-motivated. Lee and Radhakrishna (1996) report that while only 60% of the trades can be unambiguously signed, the success rate for those that can be is 93% 10 .
Flipping can be approached as a result of a decision-making process of large investors. KSW propose that the return from the offer price to the first trade is a significant factor driving the investment manager's motivation to flip an IPO. I estimate a model of the institutional manager's decision to flip. 11 For the period from January 1993 through May 1995, the regression is: 
where Mktcap is the total market capitalization of the firm at the IPO, and Return is calculated from the offer price to the first trade. (White's heteroskedasticity-adjusted tstatistics are reported in parenthesis.) The regression shows that when large investors notice negative first-trade returns, they are more likely to flip the IPO. It is evident from the regression results that the model is robust overtime.
KSW report that partitioning both on first-day return (the measure of the "temperature" of the IPO) and on the level of first-day flipping has a substantial predictive power for the future returns. I report similar results (see Table II and Figure   III ), however I find high mean return for lesser-flipped extra-hot IPOs. As stated above, a low median for extra-hot IPOs demonstrates right-skewness of the distribution.
[ Table II and Figure III [ Figure II about here]
The response to DTC's system is especially notable considering Aggarwal's (2000) finding that flipping accounts for roughly 19% of volume in the first two days using data obtained directly from the various investment banks. Using KSW's method, I
find that flipping accounts for 26% of volume in the same period. This corresponds to Aggarwal's (2000) result, since my estimator may be biased upwards in predicting the true level of flipping due to shares being traded several times after they are flipped.
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However, if this is true, I believe that capturing these "ripple trades" actually produces a better estimator of the true effect of flipping on IPO performance. 14 Though crude, the syndicate members' customers. The second report sent to all syndicate members including the lead underwriter accounts actual trades by institutional and retail customers. The system allows for up to 120 days of monitoring, but, while its costs are insignificant, usually lead underwriter stops tracking after 30 days. For more details, please see SEC Release No. 34-37208, May 13, 1996. 13 Aggarwal points to this "percolation" as a possible explanation of high first-day volume. 14 Aggarway collects the flipping data from 9 investment banks for 193 companies out of 627 IPOs identified in her sample period. The small sample may result in larger estimator error. Also, since she includes small companies (while I exclude them) for which the level of flipping is characteristically low Aggarwal's aggregate flipping values may be biased down. Please note as well that while Aggarwal reports flipping for the first two days, I look only at the first day. In an unreported test I find negligible difference between one-and two-day flipping coefficients.
ratio of the inferred sell-motivated block volume to total volume serves as an effective proxy for the level of flipping actually taking place. The practitioners, having little or no ready access to actual underwriter data may find this inexpensive measure very useful.
C. Turnover in the quiet period as potential predictor of returns
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) use large-block sell volume on the first day of trading in an IPO to predict its future performance. I extend their methodology by examining the predictive power of the turnover ratio (volume as a percent of shares offered) in the quiet period (defined as the first 25 days of trading in an IPO) for longterm returns.
As Figure IV illustrates, turnover is high on the first day of trading, but falls substantially in the next few days to the "equilibrium" level. The initial turnover and the magnitude of the drop depends on the first-day return, which is KSW's proxy for underpricing. I therefore attempted to fit this pattern of decline using an exponential decay model: 
where β 1 is the equilibrium turnover; β 2 and β 3 are parameters of the exponential function, specifying in our case the highest point of the curve on the first day, and the speed of the decline respectively; t is time as days 1 through 25.
[ Figure IV about here] Non-linear regression was used to fit the turnover data for each of the 1945 stocks in the sample. 15 Unfortunately, β 2 and β 3 were not found to be useful parameters in predicting the IPO performance. The variable, equilibrium turnover (β 1 ), was found to be very significant in predicting future returns. I found the equilibrium turnover coefficient (β 1 ) to be nearly identical to the mean turnover calculated from day 5 though 25 of each IPO. Thus the exponential model was scrapped in favor of the simpler representation of the mean day-5 through day 25 turnover 16 .
IPOs with higher quiet-period equilibrium turnover perform better in the months following the quiet-period. The effect of equilibrium turnover is demonstrated in Figure   V . One year after the end of the 25-day quiet-period, the top decile outperforms the bottom decile by 65%.
[ Figure V about here]
It seems that a significant difference exists between the first few days of trading in an IPO and the rest of the quiet period. While KSW document the predictive ability of the proxy for flipping in the first day, I test the power of the aggregate institutional 15 Gauss-Newton method used to fit the data failed to converge on 325 (17%) datapoints. However, I believe that conclusions drawn from this experiment are relevant notwithstanding this constraint. 16 Naturally, the average turnover can be found for all 1945 datapoints in the sample and is not limited to the stocks for which the exponential model converged.
selling pressure during the "equilibrium" phase of the quiet period. I construct a cumulative flipping variable as the fraction of block (10,000 shares or more) sell-signed volume from days 3 through 25 to total volume in that period.
The cumulative flipping variable is tested in a regression reported in Table III .
Other independent variables include combined first and second day flipping 17 ; first day raw return (a proxy for underpricing in KSW); and equilibrium quiet-period turnover.
All independent variables except one demonstrate diminishing power for explaining returns as the duration increases; the aggregate quiet-period flipping is the exception.
The model shows substantial explanatory capability, especially for 3-and 6-month sizeadjusted returns.
[ Table III about here]
The final table, Table IV , and corresponding Figure VI shows the results of a partition of IPOs, first sorted by low, medium and high turnover, and then those subgroups sorted by low, medium, and high flipping. As the reader can see, the intersection of high equilibrium turnover and low flipping produces the highest future returns in all three time periods (3-month, 6-month, and 1 year).
[ Table IV and Figure VI about here]
III. Conclusion
My research supports the conclusion that institutional investors appear to be informed investors in IPOs. They are able to execute prudent (and profitable) investment strategy and respond to expected low returns in the future by selling the shares of subsequently poor issues as soon as they can. KSW point out that flipping is thus a fully rational response to mispricing of the IPOs by the investment banks.
In the first 25 days of an IPO's life, new information is practically non-existent because the SEC requires a quiet period where the underwriting investment banks must not comment. Without sell-side research output, information available on newly-public firms is limited to 1) the financial information in the prospectus and 2) the prices and volume of shares traded. I collected transactions-level data for this entire 25-day period for all IPOs in my sample. 18 The empirical results on this study, especially the confirmation of Aggarwal's (2000) result, reassure me that early trading patterns of IPOs are predictive of future new issue returns and, thus, the analysis of these microstructure characteristics of the IPO quiet period produces significant predictive power for IPO returns.
Appendix: Trade-signing algorithm
The flipping ratio in Section II.C is computed as the sum of volume resulting from sell-motivated transactions of 10,000 shares or higher during the relevant day divided by the total volume for that day. Since TAQ dataset does not include the specific order data, I assign the side of the trade using the tick test algorithm proposed by Lee and
Ready (1991) (LR).
The most basic tick only uses the price data and classifies the trades into four categories: uptick (downtick) when the price is higher (lower) then the previous trade, and zero-uptick (zero-downtick) when the price remains the same, but the last price change was an uptick (downtick). Uptick (downtick) and zero-uptick (zero-downtick) correspond to buy (sell) trades.
A more effective method is to compare the trade price to the midpoint of the prevailing quote at the time of the transaction. This accounts for order-flow induced quote changes between trades. However, finding the prevailing quote, relevant to the parties at the transaction, is tricky, as quotes are often revised at the trade. As suggested by LR, I compare the price to a the best quote for the stocks across all exchanges five seconds before the each trade, except for NASDAQ issues, where I use no delay.
Classification remains the same: uptick (downtick) when the price is higher (lower) then the midpoint of the spread at the prevailing quote.
Lee and Radhakrishna (1996) test LR's approach using NYSE TORQ dataset. In addition to quotes and trades, TORQ contains data on individual orders, including the parties on each side of the trade, the specifics on execution of their orders, identities of the traders (individuals versus institutions), and order characteristics (buy-or sellinitiated trade.) Though this unique database is limited in scope, covering a sample of only 144 NYSE firms over a three-month period, it is a useful check on the correctness of the crude inference techniques.
By comparing the actual recorded details on the orders Lee and Radhakrishna (1996) find that while 40% of the trades are "non-directional." But for the 60% that can be signed using the tick test described above, 93% of the trades are signed correctly.
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Cold (<=0%) N=398
Cool (0% -10%) N=549
Hot (10% -60%) N=841
Extra-hot (>60%) N=157 Low is the bottom quartile, high is the top quartile, and medium is interquartile range. Equilibrium turnover is defined as average turnover from day 5 through 25 of an IPO. Cumulative flipping is the fraction of block (10,000 shares or more) sellsigned volume from days 3 through 25 to total volume. Returns are calculated starting on the 26th day of the IPO, at the end of the quiet period. 
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